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VUllol %Ί Ο χ ο ί , κ  μ .Ί-]
Brad Inwood, University of Toronto 
HIEROCLES: THEORY AND ARGUMENT IN THE SECOND CENTURY AD
In recent years philosophical interest in Stoicism has been directed 
mostly at its early, period, from the foundation by Zeno shortly after Aris­
totle^ death, through its acme under Chrysippus, to the late second century 
BC, or perhaps into the first with Posidonius0 This is right and proper0 
Sharp philosophical debate flourishéd then; fundamental issues were tackled 
by way of close argumentation; exciting comprehensive theories were put for­
ward for criticism and refinement. In the decades and centuries which followed 
the schoolfs influence held strong and even grew0 But the philosophical stan­
dard, we tend to think, declined, at least in the preserved texts. There was 
no second Chrysippus. And neither was there a second Carneades to stimulate 
a new re-examination of the philosophical foundations laid in the days of the 
archaioio Instead, I suppose, we tend to see the arid doxographical tradition 
and its hangers-on, the deliberate popularization of Cicero, the irksome in­
consistency of Seneca, the homilies of Musonius and the personal reflections of 
Marcus Aurelius0
Naturally the revival of interest in the Stoa has focussed on the fertile 
early period, despite the barriers which lie in the way of reliable reconstruc­
tion. But all is not lost in the later period, which is, after all, so much bet­
ter documented. We are not, in fact, reduced to a meagre diet of hand-me-down 
moralizing in the time after Posidoniusc My present subject is only one of the 
points of serious philosophical interest in this later period. I will deal with 
Hierocles, a Stoic philosopher of uncertain provenance and probably Hadrianic 
date0 But in doing so I do not wish to suggest that similar gems are not to 
be found in Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus and yes, even in Cicero0 Hierocles is, I 
hope you will agree, worthy of more attention than he has received since his 
treatise on the foundations of ethics was published in its first modern edition 
over seventy-five years ago. The general tendency has been to use Hierocles1 
text primarily to shed light on the earlier Stoa, as its editor von Arnim did 
in his introduction, and not to consider him in his own right as a serious 
philosopher.(1) Pembroke too(2) takes this approach, assuming that Hierocles1 
orthodox discussion is wholly inherited from earlier sources. He is kinder to 
Hierocles than is von Arnim, who seems to feel that he is capable of gross 
blunders whenever he departs from attested theories of the school0 But even 
Pembroke sees him as a mere packager of theories: ,!his personal contribution
is little more than the verbal mannerisms and stock examples of the professional 
lecturer”.
It must, of course, be conceded that it is impossible to prove that any of 
Hierocles1 arguments were original. We know that some at least were inherited; 
some of his examples, too, were used by earlier Stoics, as their appearance in 
letter 121 of Seneca shows. And the basic doctrine Hierocles was defending was 
orthodox too. The hypothesis of complete philosophical unoriginality is tempt­
ing, all the more so since the style of his treatise is fluent, rhetorical and 
sophisticated, obviously appealing to a wider non-specialist audience.
Yet his accessible style should not prejudice us against his philosophical 
merits, and I suggest that the issue of Hierocles1 originality in argument be 
left open. In a sense the uncertainty on this point is irrelevante For the
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important thing is the quality of his thought and its relevance to the philo­
sophical issues of his day« If lively and acute debate about basic problems in 
Stoic ethics was still before the public in the second century AD, then that is 
important as a counterbalance to the often disappointing picture one gets of 
Stoicism in the imperial period·
We know remarkably little about Hierocles, and this is a matter for regreto 
Ignorance of his birthplace and early life is tolerable, although I would per­
sonally like to know if he really was the former athlete from the village of 
Hyllarima in Caria mentioned by Stephen of Byzantiunio(3) He has been plausibly 
identified with the Hierocles Stoicus, vir sanctus et gravis whose anti- 
Epicurean apophthegms Gellius knew through the report of his mentor Calvenus 
Taurus, the Platonist (Noctes Atticae 9·5ο8), and this is the principal evidence 
used to establish his probable date. But even this much is a recent gain· It 
was Karl Práechter who demonstrated in 1901 that the Hierocles from whose works 
Stobaeus copied out extracts was in fact this second-century Stoic and not a 
later neo-Platoiiist. Von Arnim built upon Praechterfs exemplary detective work 
when, in 1906, he showed that the author of the then recently discovered papyrus 
bearing the title Ethike Stoicheiosis was also the same man· Thus we have a 
date for the man, extensive extracts or fragments from two (4) of his works and, 
as a conjecture, his approximate location. Taurus1 familiarity with him sug­
gests activity in Athens or, at the most remote, in one of the centres of 
higher learning in the Greek easto
This is little enough to go on; but it is something to know that our philo­
sopher worked in the ambience of the Greek sophistic and philosophical revival 
of the second century AD, at a time when middle Platonism was flourishing and 
served to bring into fruitful contact ideas and themes from all the principal 
schools of Greek philosophy·
A complete review of Hierocles1 work would be out of place hereQ What I 
propose is a consideration of two important questions concerning the traditional 
Stoic doctrine of oikeiosis, in an attempt to see the sort of position Hierocles 
takes on these central questions, to determine something about the intellectual 
milieu in which he operated and about his philosophical style· The larger 
goal will be to present a partial picture of Stoic philosophical activity in 
this later period which, I hope, will justify the belief that philosophically 
interesting Stoicism did not die out with Posidonius·
The two questions are these: why does Hierocles devote so much of what
survives of the Stoicheiosis to the problem of self-perception? and second, what 
is the relationship between the egoistic oikeiosis with which all animals are 
said to begin life and the fundamental oikeiosis to other human beings which 
supports the Stoic conviction that other-regarding behaviour is essential to 
living the rational life? Both of these questions arose in the earlier Stoa, 
and it seems that on neither point did they succeed in satisfying their criticso 
The debate on these, as on other points, continued0 A notion of Hierocles1 posi­
tion provides more than just evidence for and confirmation of earlier views0 It 
tells us what sort of philosopher he was and what sort of debate went on in his 
own day·
The attention given to self-perception by Hierocles is striking. Only 
twelve columns (of about sixty lines each) are preserved in any form, some of 
them so fragmentary as to be useless· Yet by the beginning of column 9 he has
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advanced to a consideration of the Jtelos, the goal of life which is rooted in 
the oikeiosis to oneself which exists from birth· By column 11 the discussion 
has advanced to the three(5) different kinds of oikeiosis (to oneself, to other 
men and to external things); presumably their respective roles in the good life are 
being consideredo Columns 1-8, then, deal with foundational matters, the psycho­
logical facts about human and animal nature which determine what the good life 
in fact is· Of this stretch of text, the first half column describes the con­
ception and maturation of the embryo until, at the time of birth, its phusis 
becomes a psuche and it itself becomes an animal for the first time· Then five 
full columns are devoted to the question of self-perception0 The balance of 
this part of the treatise, about 1 1/2 columns, argues that animals are in fact 
endowed with an orientation to self-love and self-preservation.
Human beings are not singled out for. special treatment at this point— all 
animals are under review. This is the normal Stoic procedure when dealing with 
this theme: human nature as the natural basis for ethics is considered first
in those points which it shares with all animals. Manfs moral evolution is pro­
tray ed as a growth from his non-rational, animal origins to his adult and 
characteristically human rational state. But the emphasis on perception is 
disproportionate, and Hierocles himself notes this at the outset (1.31-37).
He reminds his audience that two psychological faculties are characteristic of 
animals, horme and aisthesis, and says that the former can be dispensed with for 
his present purposes:
Next one must keep in mind that every animal differs from the 
non-animal because of two things: perception and impulse0 We have 
no need of the latter for present purposes, but it seems right to 
say a few things about perceptiono For it contributes to a knowledge 
of the primary oikeion, and we have said that this theory will be 
the best starting point for the ’Foundations of Ethics’.
Now, if we compare Hierocles’ treatment to others, in Cicero (De Finibus 3) 
and in the summary of Chrysippus’ views preserved by Diogenes Laertius (7.85-86), 
the amount of space devoted to aisthesis and sunaisthesis is startling. Cicero 
(3.16) begins with a general statement of the oikeiosis relationship and merely 
notes in passing that perception of self is a necessary condition: fieri autem
non posset ut appeterent aliquid nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. 
Chrysippus’ account is similar:
They say that the animal has its primary impulse to preserving 
itself since Nature oriented it to itself from the beginning, as Chry­
sippus says in book one of. his On Goals, saying that the primary 
oikeion for each animal is its owfi constitution and- awareness of this 
(io60 self-perception, reading sunaisthesin for the mss’ suneidesin)0
Note here the prominent place of the concept Hierocles dismisses, horme. This 
emphasis continues through 86 and is also found in Cicero’s version (appeterent)o 
Even more passing references to the doctrine of oikeiosis are more likely to 
stress the desiderative rather than the perceptual basis of it.(6) Hierocles’ 
decision to focus on self-perception as the central question is both deliberate 
and unusual.
But while this decision is notable in contrast to the orthodox emphasis of
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Chrysippus and Cicero (whose probable source is Diogenes of Babylon), it is not 
unparalleled«, One of Seneca’s most valuable letters (121) (7) is devoted en­
tirely to the theme of self-perception in animals in the context of the theory of 
oikeiosis. Sources for his discussion are named: Archedemus and Posidonius0
Neither of these men was unoriginal, although Posidonius? departures from ortho­
doxy were more significant. It is apparent that one or both of them had faced 
critics who denied the existence or significance of self-perception. Seneca 
seems to feel that this is still worth discussion, although we may wonder 
whether any contemporary critic lurks behind his imaginary interlocutor0 This is 
the same issue to which Hierocles devotes so much space.
So it is clear that his problem is a traditional crux of Stoic theory. 
Similarities with material in Seneca show that Hierocles exploited traditional 
theories in dealing with the question«, But there are differences between 
Hierocles’ and Seneca’s discussions. Seneca treats the issue as a mere detail 
of traditional Stoic theory, not crucial for the practical matters of ethics; 
it is a peripheral dogma of the sort that Epictetus too deprecates. Accordingly 
it is dealt with almost apologetically in an isolated letter devoted exclusively 
to the themeo(8)
But Hierocles builds the discussion of self-perception into the fabric of 
his ’Foundations of Ethics’(9) allowing it, moreover, to dominate the early 
pages of the work. It is not a peripheral issue; it is a central part of the 
psychological theory which is of vital importance for ethics. Moreover, the issue 
is a focus of live debate for Hierocles, not a footnote to the history of school 
doctrine0
The discussion of self-perception can be approached from two points of view. 
First, we may try to get some notion of the significance of this issue for 
Hierocles and of his motivations for concentrating on it. Accurate perception 
of the important issues is a valuable trait in a philosopher and that alone 
would justify more respect than is usually given to Hierocles. Second, we may 
look at the arguments themselves in an attempt to appreciate their force and 
effectiveness. Here too, I would argue, Hierocles is more interesting than he 
is usually given credit forc His arguments are varied and (some of them, at 
least) acute. Even the more rhetorical elaborations contain more of philosophi­
cal interest than might appear at first sight.
Hierocles’ main points are that all animals do in fact have a perception 
of themselves, that it begins with birth and is continuous throughout life and 
that such self-perception is the necessary condition for any perception of ex­
ternal objects. After a discussion of oikeiosis itself he returns (at the end 
of column 7) to self-perception and its character, apparently claiming that our 
perception of self becomes more accurate and thorough as we mature (cfQ Seneca 
Letter 121.10-13)0 Where our text becomes unusable at 8.27 Hierocles has em­
barked on a comparison of Cleanthes’ and Chrysippus’ views on this topic. This 
renewal of the predominant theme almost seems to reduce the discussion of 
oikeiosis itself to the status of a digression.
Why this obsession with one theme, to the disadvantage of horme and of 
oikeiosis itself? One reason, perhaps the reason, emerges clearly from Hierocles’ 
text itselfo His polemical remarks, some of them quite sharp,(10) are directed 
against some unnamed critics who deny the existence of self-perception. Hie­
rocles is in a debate with opponents who have kept the issue alive down into the 
second century AD. Who are these people?
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This question will be easier to deal„with when Hierocles1 arguments have been 
considered,»»since the arguments themselves clarify the position he takes, and 
bring out several relevant features of the Stoic position? « . "
The main discussion runs from 1.37-6*24. The theme is introduced with a 
characteristic rhetorical flourish (1.37-39): "One ought not to be unaware that
the animal perceives itself right away, as soon as it is born"0 This is followed 
by an unflattering reference to those who are too slow-witted to see the point.
But Hierocles first digresses (1.40-3.54) in order to prove to others even more 
bereft of sense that animals ever have self-perception at all.
In addition to arguments which he passes over (3.52-54— another rhetorical 
touch), Hierocles gives two sets of arguments for this claim. Each one consists 
of a general statement about animal behaviour elaborated by a number of often 
quite interesting examples to support the generalization.
First (1.51-2.3) he argues that all animals perceive their own limbs and 
organs and grasp their proper functions. Unfortunately his account of the posi­
tion of his opponents is obscured by gaps in the papyrus (1.44-1.50), although it 
is obvious that their error begins in supposing that nature gave animals percep- 
tion only for the purpose of grasping external objects and not also for perception 
of themselves. This limited role of perception is disproved, he claims, by the 
fact that animals do know a good deal about themselves. Birds perceive that wings 
are for flying; land animals perceive what their various limbs are for. He then 
appeals to humans: we know instinctively what functions our eyes and ears are
meant to serve. A human will never get this wrong and try to hear with his eyes 
or see with his ears (nor to walk with his hands or grasp with his feet). The 
argument is not fully developed, but its force can be brought out by further re­
flection. The fact that irrational animals display the same sort of certainty 
in their behaviour shows that it is instinctive and not a matter of rational 
inference or experiment. Moreover, we do not in fact learn by trial and error 
that eyes are for seeing etc. This is a necessary and not a contingent fact, 
Hierocles reasonably assumes. There would be something mildly absurd in the picture 
of a new-born child trying to focus his ears on a new sight and then, realizing 
that this was no good, trying it next with his nose and finally hitting on the 
eyes as the appropriate organ. No, the fact that this coordination of organ and 
function is automatic argues for an inborn self-awareness.
Seneca (letter 12105-9) provides an argument of similar nature (121.5:
membra apte et.expedite movent non aliter quam in hoc erudita) and the differences
in the treatment suggest that Hierocles is contributing something of his own here. 
Seneca explicitly uses the contrast of instinctive and learned behaviour, which 
Hierocles has suppressed0 Perhaps Senecajs greater completeness is to his credit. 
Hierocles assumes this traditional point. But Seneca bends his argument to a 
different purpose. He is concerned to argue against a hedonistic interpretation 
of such behaviour (and gives in 121.8 good examples in support of this), whereas 
Hierocles is not. The anti-hedonistic focus goes back to Chrysippus ( D.L. 7.85-86). 
But for Hierocles, whose opponents are not hedonists, this point is unnecessary,,
It is reasonable to suppose that he is deliberately shaping traditional arguments 
to the current dialectical challenge, which was narrowly focussed on perception of 
the self.
The second argument (2.3-3.52) is based on the fact that animals know
6-
instinctively how to use their natural weapons to defend themselves. Contra 
von Arnim (pp. xx-xxi), this is not merely a special case of the first argumento 
For it involves an important new point, that such behaviour presupposes perception 
of others as well as demonstratipg self-perception (as Hieroeles points out at 
3o20-23, cf. 3.50 kai). It also prepares the listener for the theme of self- 
preservation treated later. Since this too is a behavioural argument, we have a 
series of examples again* These carry the main burden of proof, although the 
particular points are interspersed with generalizations (2.7-9; 2.18-20; 3.46-52 
in conclusion). The richness of the examples of animal behaviour gives the 
section of the treatise the appearance of a bestiaryQ Bulls, snakes, turtles, 
lions, snails, bears, deer, beaver, young birds and more exotic beasts as well 
march vividly through Hieroeles’ columns. His presentation is lively and enter­
taining. This shows that his purpose is not just to edify and to convince, but 
also to reach a general, non-specialist audience. It does not show that Hieroeles 
is a mere rhetorician0
It would be impossible to discuss all the inmates of Hieroeles’ zoo here.
One or two of his examples suffice to indicate the character of this argument.
He is arguing that animals are naturally aware of those features of their natures 
which have been provided by nature for the purpose of their own protection 
(2.3-5) and that they are also aware of the natures of other animals— potential 
predators. Deer (2.46-3.2) provide a particularly useful example, since there 
is a marked discrepancy between the real defensive equipment (fragile-looking 
legs which are capable of great speed) and apparent defensive gear (the horns—  
impressive to look at but not as useful and often a hindrance to flight if they 
have grown too large). Deer, Hieroeles says, are aware of this automatically 
and instinctively rely on fleet-footedness for self-defence? They even reduce 
the dangers of excessively large antlers by knocking them off on hard objects.
If one were to attempt to infer by appearances how a deer should protect itself, 
one would not have such a sure grasp of the truth as the deer’s own self-perception 
gives it. Similarly, bears (2.27-31) are instinctively aware, of the vulnerability 
of their heads to blows— not what one would expect by looking at them0 Serpentine 
behaviour is also used (3o2-9): when slithering to safety they do not, it is
alleged, d° the obvious thing and slide head first down their holes— for that 
would leave their tails undefended. Instead, being aware of their strengths and 
weaknesses, they back down the hole, covering their retreat with their fangs.
The famous ’spitting snake1 (2.12-18) yields another illustration. Its venom is, 
allegedly, cast not injected by a bite. This is odd, and one wonders how these 
snakes realize this about themselves. Surely not by observation or experience0 
No. They are simply aware of their own natures and act accordingly, the fruit of 
self-perception.
This argument relies for its effectiveness on the belief that an awareness of 
the animal’s own nature is either the only or the most obvious explanation for 
such behaviour. This sort of inference from effect to cause can be precarious 
if other explanations suggest themselves0 For some of Hieroeles’ examples this is 
definitely possible; imitation of parents, trial and error and the observation of 
other animals are contenders for the explanatory role he assigns to self-perception. 
On this point the present argument is more vulnerable than the first one, and this 
may explain why it is developed at such great length and with so many examples.
For if self-perception is the obvious explanation for some of his cases and if 
one also assumes a certain uniformity in the natural behaviour of animals, then 
cases for which a range of explanations are possible will themselves be most 
economically explained by self-perception. The large number of examples reinforce 
one another if a cornnon hypothesis can account for all the phenomena.
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Another threat looms for this argument. If the animals mentioned do not in 
fact behave as is claimed, then the inference to self-perception as the explana­
tion for it is worthless. I am not enough of a zoologist to be sure, but it 
sometimes seems that Hierocles shares some of the credulity so endemic to the 
ancients about animal behaviour. Are there really spitting snakes which do not 
bite? Do beavers really castrate themselves to escape pursuers (3.9-19)? Any 
argument which relies on ancient standards of observation of animal behaviour 
is offering a hostage to fortune and future critics. This potential weakness too 
is less of a threat to the first argument.
The final observation to be made here is that the second argument supports 
the claim not just that animals have a perception of themselves, but also of 
themselves in relation to other animals. We shall return to this later.
So much for Hierocles1 arguments for his first claim0 Next Hierocles argues 
that self-perception is continuous and uninterrupted throughout the animal's 
life. There is a series of proofs. The first is a complex technical argument 
employing traditional Stoic doctrines on the nature and relation of body and 
soul (3.56-4.53). The argument runs as follows:
Step 1 (3o56-4.3) Both are corporeal.
Step 2 (4.3-4.22) 
Step 3 (4.22-4.27) 
Step 4 (4.27-4.38)
They are mixed in a total krasis di' hoIon and therefore interact.
The soul is (or has, to be precise) a dunamis aisthetike.
The nature of the soul's perceptive interaction with the body 
is described (the text is very bad here, but Hierocles gave 
an account of the tonike kinesis).
Step 5 (4.38-4.53) The conclusion draws together these premisses and claims that
it follows that the soul must be in a constant state of per­
ceiving the body. The interaction of body and soul is an 
antilepsis; such interaction is simply equivalent to what is 
meant by an animal perceiving itself.
This argument is noteworthy, not just because it offers us new details of 
Stoic theory (as von Arnim says, p. xxii). It also gives every sign of being an 
original one. (Again, von Arnim1s interest is solely in traditional elements used 
in the argument. His overly critical attitude to Hierocles1 own contribution is 
obvious.) It accurately employs traditional Stoic psychology in an apparently 
new way in order to argue for a traditional doctrine. The conclusion is a strong 
one (4.52-3): the psychic functions he describes are shown to be equivalent to
the fact of self-perception. Thus the acceptance of the physical analysis of the 
soul's operation commits one to the claim Hierocles wishes to defend. The physical 
theory is taken as scientific fact (and we may well wonder about the adequacy of 
contemporary alternatives to this theory, at least from a materialist perspective); 
in this way an important part of the foundations of ethics is given an allegedly 
independent and objective demonstrationo It is characteristic of the Stoics to 
move from the uncertainties of ethics to the solid ground of physics when support­
ing their theories. Here too a useful contrast to other schools may be discernedo 
As one could show from a more detailed examination of Stoic psychology, their 
'naturalism' in ethics had a special flavour lacking in Aristotelian and Platonic 
theories (although perhaps not in Epicurean): the claims about human and animal
- 8 “
psychology used to ground ethical doctrines are detailed, exact and technicalo 
They did not rely on generalities which were as precise as the inaccurate sub­
ject matter of ethics demanded (NB Nicomachean Ethics 1013, 1102a23-27) 0 
Aristotle’s difficulties in reconciling his treatment of akrasia (NE 1013, 703) 
with his scientific conception of psychic powers not divided into Platonic parts 
(DA 3o9), which culminates in the obscurities of DA 3.11, were not shared by 
the Stoics, largely because of their rather different views about the relation­
ship between physics and a naturalistic ethics. Hierocles retained and ad­
vanced this philosophical method in his own worko
This long argument gives us an insight into what Hierocles meant by the 
’self.1· Problems of what constitutes the self are not at the centre of Hierocles1 
interest, as he is primarily concerned with perception of the self. But the issue 
is of intrinsic interest and is suggested by Hierocles’ arguments. The first 
two focussed on a limited aspect of the self— the animal’s capacities, limbs, 
organs and instinctive behaviour patterns. He made no pretense that this was 
the whole story about ’self’.. These partial aspects merely provided a basis for 
suggestive arguments (see 1.39-40: pros hupomnesin toutou)0 But still it is
noteworthy that no distinction was drawn in the earlier arguments between bodily 
parts and capacities or behaviour patterns. This suggests that the self is seen 
as a unity, a compound of soul and body; it also suggests,that a Stoic would be 
out of sympathy with a Platonic view which identified the true self with the 
soul aloneo This is confirmed by letter 121.10 of Seneca, where the ’constitu­
tion’ of the animal (arguably meant to be equivalent to the self— see Alexander 
De Anima Mantissa p0 150) is defined as a relational disposition: the mind in a
certain condition relative to the body: principale animi quodam modo se habens
erga corpuso
The major argument just considered points in the same direction. For it 
depends upon the premiss that the body and Söul are both material substances 
inextricably blended in a perfect mixture which explains their intimate inter­
actions (4o3-22)o Although the discussion of the soul’s tonike kinesis is 
lacunose, it is clear that the fact that the blend of body and soul is perfect 
explains why the perceptual power of the soul is not directed just at the body 
as a distinct entityG The body could, not be sensed without the soul being 
sensed as wello No gap could arise between perception of the body and percep­
tion of the soul which would need to be bridged by further theory or argument.
Thus his conclusion (4051-53): "a grasp occurs of all the parts both of the
body and of the soul, and this is equivalent to the animal perceiving itself11.
The conclusion of this argument carefully recapitulates its key steps; 
again we see Hierocles’ rhetorical skill and his deliberate concern to present 
his audience with a clear case0 The same commendable interest in clarity is 
apparent in the next argument, which consists of a series of examples (4.53-5.35): 
after all, examples may persuade where logoi to not (marturia ... pista ton logon 
ta sumbainonta— 4053-54)0 He alleges that our behaviour in sleep shows that self­
perception occurs even then, when conscious awareness is not present. In sleep 
we rearrange the blankets to stay warm, we gingerly avoid lying on sore spots, we 
even keep track of time so as to awake at the appointed hour next morning (a 
trick some people, I fear, are better at than others)0 Further, one’s waking 
concerns manifest themselves in sleep: the miser grasps his purse, the drunkard
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his bottle, the modest girl keeps her dress decorously arranged (as Polyxena did 
even in death) and Herakles slumbers with a firm grip on his club· If onefs 
character is manifested in sleep, there must be some kind of self-awareness 
governing this behaviour0 The argument is then generalized to include animals 
too, as the thesis requires, and this move is supported by argument, though not 
by further examples (5o23 ffQ)o Behind all of this, though not in express 
terms,(11) is a good, a fortiori argument. If we are aware of ourselves even 
in sleep, then surely also while awake0 Therefore always0
It is worth while to pause here and consider Hierocles* use of examples, 
which is so extensive and striking in the treatiseQ For such ample use of what 
are taken to be mere illustrations tends, some have thought, to mark him as a 
mere elaborator of school dogma0 But as the methodological remark at 4053-54. 
suggests, these examples are not mere illustrations (at least not all of them).
The presentation of carefully chosen and often startling examples of human and 
animal behaviour is part of a respectable philosophical technique. The strategy 
is to find instances of behaviour which only make sense if we postulate psycho­
logical traits of the desired character0 One takes the observable behaviour as 
a sign (semeion or marturion) of the unobservable facts0 This reasoning from 
effect to cause may be seen as a form of inference to the best explanation. As 
always in such a procedure, the most enlightening examples are those which are 
surprising— because they can only be explained in light of a particular theory.
Thus the appeal of the puzzling and unusual— such as the apparently self-destruc­
tive behaviour of the beaver (3o9 ffQ; note eti de thaumasioteron). The case of 
soldiers who fraternize with the enemy (11.19 ff· note to de thaumasiotation) is 
a similar example used to prove a different point: it only makes sense if men are
endowed with strong social instincts. In the same way, the hypothesis that the 
beaver has self-perception relative to his predators explains why it maims 
itself in its drive for self-preservationo If it did not have such a self­
perception the behaviour would be incomprehensible. One-might also compare the 
effectiveness of the examples designed to prove the instinct to self-love and 
self-preservation itself from the behaviour of people who are in painful or dis­
tasteful physical states(12) (7016 ffc; nóte to de thaumasiotaton at 7024) 0 Such 
determined attachment to oneself even in an unnatural state makes best sense, 
Hierocles claims, if the Stoic theory is right and one’s primary orientation is to 
oneselfo
This mode of argument from examples, especially from well-chosen cases of 
otherwise inexplicable behaviour, is interesting and certainly intellectually 
respectable; and Hierocles shows that he is aware of it as a distinct mode of 
argumento Of course, such a form of argument is only effective if one accepts 
the premiss that nature operates in a reasonable, relatively uniform and goal- 
directed manner; but this was widely accepted by the Stoics and their opponents. 
Hierocles1 exploitation of what may be called the argumentum ex mirabilibus is, 
to be sure, developed rhetorically; but underlying it is an appreciation of the 
vital role of crucial examples in any attempt to infer causes from effects. That 
the wide range of examples chosen is also rhetorically attractive should not blind 
us to the effective use of non-deductive argumento
Yet) as the argument at 3056-4053 shows, deductive argument was also 
employedo So was a more dialectical style, in the argument to show that continuous 
self-perception starts at birth (5015-5.52): even birth is part of our lifetime
(and so the body-soul argument discussed above applies); moreover, his opponents 
are challenged to state which moment of life except the first could be defended 
as the starting point of self-perception. If the second, why not the first.
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which is relevantly similar? A form of sorites, now wielded by a Stoic rather 
than an Academic, seems to lurko
Again, examples of animal behaviour (5.52-5060) reinforce the case0 The 
pattern of Hierocles’ argumentative technique is now clear: an effective alter­
nation of philosophical technicalities and lively examples, of deduction, 
inference and dialectic. Before moving on, Hierocles summarizes the main point: 
all grasp of external objects of perception entails self-perception. And he 
supports this with another argument adapted from the Cyrenaics (cf. Sextus M 
7o191:(13) perceiving something white entails perceiving that we are ’whitened1, 
perceiving something hot that we are ’heated’, perceiving something sweet that 
we are ’sweetened’ (5.60-6o10)o We can see how the conception of the self as an 
intimate union of the body and the corporeal yet percipient soul underlies this 
pointo For if it were just the bodily sense organ which was ’whitened’, as in 
Aristotle’s theory, then this would only show that the soul perceived the body 
when it perceived an external objecto But the corporeal soul is mixed into the 
aistheterion0 It too is ’whitened’, so the soul is aware of itself as well as 
the body and the external object. Any tendency to psycho-physical dualism or to 
belief in the incorporeality of the soul would vitiate this argument.
Hierocles’ final argument is a general metaphysical one (6o10-6.22): all
dominant faculties (hegemonikai dunameis) apply first to themselves; this is 
supported by references to other faculties, hexis and phusis; then it is argued 
that perception is such a faculty; therefore perception perceives itself before 
it perceives others0 The argument may be flawed by selection of perception 
alone as the dominant power in the soul,(14) but this emphasis is characteristic 
of Hierocles and suggests that this too may well be an original argument. The 
series of arguments concludes with a summary of the thesis which Hierocles regards 
as established (6.22-24): "as soon as it is born the animal perceives itself"0
I have not exhaustively discussed Hierocles’ various arguments for self- ' 
perception0 This is a topic for further study. But they are varied and acute, 
and some seem to be origínalo They show a detailed familiarity with the technica­
lities of Stoic psychology, which are handled with independence and tempered 
by Hierocles’ sensitivity to his audience’s need for clarity and diversion, and a 
sharp realization that the ethically significant account of animal behaviour must 
be grounded in a detailed psychological theory. Much of the raw material is 
traditional, but the handling of it is intelligent. Even his reliance on earlier 
theory for the premisses of his arguments is not to his discredit, since much 
of the detailed psychology still stood out as the best and most detailed 
materialist theory of its day (though the physiology had been challenged by 
medical research)0 As far as we know, the essential basis of the psychological 
theory had not yet been seriously impugned by the critics of the Stoa.
Let us now return to our original puzzle0 Hierocles devotes an extra­
ordinary amount of care to the demonstration that self-perception is a fact. We 
have seen that he is determined to refute certain opponents who deny this Stoic 
thesis. Who were they? Why did they deny it?
For a clue to who the opponents are I suggest that we look to some of the 
other theories of oikeiosis in antiquity, which are not properly Stoic but 
which were inspired by the Stoic theory and which we may call ’para-Stoic’, 
and also to criticisms of the Stoic view0 For some para-Stoic theories differ 
markedly over the role played by self-perception and some criticisms turn on 
the role of perception in their theory. Here we may hope to find a basis for 
plausible conjectures about Hierocles’ opponents and their concerns.
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Let us begin with the aecount in Arius Didymus which is probably that of 
Eudorus of Alexandria.(15) This Academic shows very little divergence from the 
Stoics on the vital role played by self-perception, making it a key component 
in the affiliation to oneself which all animals have, although he is not parti­
cularly clear about its exact relationship to the oikeiosis0 What he says is 
that the subordinate goal (hupotelis) is the primary oikeion from the moment 
at which the animal begins to perceive its own constitution. He explains:
"For upon being born the animal was certainly oriented to something from the 
beginning"; and then Eudorus proceeds to outline in Carneadeän fashion the 
three possible objects of this affiliation: the prota kata phusin, pleasure or
freedom from pain. His choice is obviously for the first of these, which dis­
tinguishes his theory as non-Stoic and as dependent possibly on Antiochus* anti- 
Stoic critique, certainly on that of Carneades0 But the .essential point is that 
self-perception has a vital role from the moment of birthQ We find no clue to 
the inspiration of Hierocles’ anti-Stoic opponents hereQ
Later in Stobaeus, however, there is another para-Stoic account of oikeiosis, 
again probably compiled by Arius Didymus but attributed by him (or by Stobaeus) 
to the Peripatetic school. It has long been recognized that this account owes much 
to Antiochus’ theory;(16) like the account in De Finibus 5 it is said to be 
Peripatetic in origin. Here, though, at Eel. 20ll8-9, there is no reference to 
self-perception. Indeed perception plays virtually no role at all in the Antio- 
chean/Peripatetic theory as Arius reports ito
The same is true of the more genuinely Peripatetic theories of the proton 
oikeion which are reported by Alexander0(17) This short discussion is a good 
example of how Aristotle’s treatises, which do not deal explicitly with this 
topic, could be interpreted, sensitively or otherwise, by later Peripatetics in 
an effort to develop the ’true’ Aristotelian view on an issue which first arose 
after the master’s deatho Xenarchus, Boethus, Verginius Rufus, Sosicrates and 
Alexander himself all had their theories. In none of them is self-perception of any 
importanceo The commitment of the animal, whether it be to pleasure, itself, 
perfection, energeia or life, is not made dependent on any explicit requirement 
for self-awareness. In this the later Peripatetics are faithfully reflecting 
the content of the Aristotelian texts which they used to develop their own theories.
The situation with the Antiochean material in Cicero is slightly more com­
plexe All the accounts of neo-natal self-love(18) are bereft of references to 
self-perception which exists from the moment of birth and is the necessary condi­
tion for oikeiosis o But there are several references to an analogous phenomenon 
in human beings0 As they grow up they gradually acquire self-knowledge— not 
perception but knowledge (2.33/ 5o24 ff., 5.41 ff.)0(19) This is clearest at 5.24:
Omne animal se ipsum diligit, ac simul ortum est id agit ut se con- 
servet, quod hie ei primus ad omnem vitam tuendam appetitus a natura 
datur, se ut conservet atque ita sit affectum ut optime secundum 
naturam affectum esse possitc hanc initio institutionem confusam 
habet et incertain, ut tantummodo se tueatur qualecumque sit; sed nec 
quid sit nec quid possit nec quid ipsius natura sit intellegit. 
cum autem processit paulum et quatenus quidque se attingat ad seque per- 
tineat perspicere coepit, turn sensim. incipit progredi seseque agno- 
scere et intellegere quam ob causam habeat eum quern diximus animi 
appetitum, coeptatque et ea quae naturae sentit apta appetere et pro­
pulsare contraria, ergo omni animali illud quod appétit positum est in 
eo quod naturae est accommodatunio ita finis bonorum exs is tit, secundum
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naturaxn vivere sic affectum ut optime affici possit ad naturamque 
accommodatissime0
There are several features about this Stoically inspired account which are worth 
notingo First, there is a strong emphasis on horme, but it is clearly thought 
of as being independent of any cognitive or perceptual activities. Moreover, 
the acquisition of self-knowledge is clearly meant to be subsequent, temporally 
and logically, to the love of self which all animals are born with and to the 
appetitus which this love causes0 (Contrast the account De Finibus 3, where 
self-perception is a necessary condition for self-love and the corresponding 
desireso) Nevertheless, the presence of this growing self-knowledge in the animalfs 
later life does enable Antiochus to stay close to the Stoic account of the later 
stages of moral evolution, according to which we gradually realize our affilia­
tion to reason and virtue as we come to see that our true selves are centred on 
these concepts,(20) and it also enables him to retain the Stoic account of the 
telos as life according to nature. But the important point for contrast to 
the Stoics is with respect to their view of the new-born animal. Self-percep­
tion is not the basis for self-love and impulse; nor is it the root of the sub­
sequent rational self-knowledge. * *
The difference between the Stoics and Antiochus emerges clearly from the 
fact that even plants, according to Antiochus,(21) have natural drives to self- 
preservation0 For Antiochus this basic drive of nature is quite independent of 
perception or even of conscious participation by the agent. Self-perception or 
self-knowledge, of which the Stoics made so much use, has a role only in the 
further evolution of the commitment to oneself0 As we learn what our nature 
really calls for, our motivations evolve accordingly0 But self-perception is 
not given as a necessary condition of self-love by Antiochus— -any more than 
it was by Aristotle0
We can trace this kind of para-Stoic theory down to Hierocles1 own day.(22)
For the same Platonist Calvenus Taurus who refers to Hieroclesf anti-Epicurean 
slogans with approval also gives us a para-Stoic account of oikeiosis (Noctes 
Atticae 12.15) which, as Dillon notes,is on other points noticeably Antiochean 
in character.(23) In this version too self-perception plays no foundational 
role0
We may conjecture that those whose own theories of oikeiosis omitted 
self-perception, like the Academics and Peripatetics, engaged in criticism of 
the Stoic theory, though.the Academy would be the more likely home for vigorous 
polemic. Archedemus and Posidonius, Seneca’s sources in Letter 121, must have 
had opponents who argued an anti-Stoic line. Antiochus himself had an argument, 
although relatively feeble, against their positionfbe Finibus 5041 ffo see 
below). I would like to suggest that Hierocles1 opponents were in the same 
tradition. Some contemporary Academic, possibly Taurus himself, had been 
challenging the role of self-perception in oikeiosis recently enough and vigorously 
enough to provoke Hierocles into response0 He saw the continuation of this 
criticism as a major threat to the orthodox Stoic theory; accordingly he set out 
to respond to their arguments, somewhat ill-naturedly, even at the cost of 
distorting the scale and scope of the general treatise he was writing.
Several questions arise at this point. Why was this such a major issue for 
Hierocles? Why did the opponents disagree with the Stoic emphasis on self- 
perception? What philosophical point hangs on the issue?
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Plutarch may provide our next clue. In that polemical ragbag entitled 
On Stoic Self-Contradictions there is a chapter (12) dealing with oikeiosis.
He begins by quoting Chrysippus to the effect that for the non-sage nothing is 
useful, oikeion or appropriate and that to the sage nothing is allotrion.
He then confronts him with references to the oikeiosis doctrine according to 
which from birth on men (and all animals) do have an oikeiosis to themselves 
inter alia0 He then concludes: "But neither is there perception for those to 
whom nothing is perceptible nor oikeiosis for those to whom nothing is oikeion; 
for oikeiosis seems to be a perception and grasp of what is oikeion.11 (24)
The reference to perception comes as a bit of a surprise to this point, 
since it is not mentioned in the opening of the chapter which set Chrysippus 
up for the contradiction. But the point about oikeiosis is clear. Chrysippus 
used the term both normatively, to refer to the ideal affinities to ultimate 
values which only a fully mature sage has, and descriptively, to refer to the 
basis of this in the natural endowments of the new-born anímalo Letter 121 
of Seneca explains how the Stoics linked the two by means of a complex theory of 
moral evolution, but Plutarch’s polemic leaves no room for such a deep and 
fair account of Stoic principles. Glib demonstration of prima facie self- 
contradiction is his game.
But what of the intrusive perception here? Surely an analogous point is 
being made0 The Stoics, I suggest, defined perception in the same dual way 
in which oikeiosis was characterized. Ideally it is an assent to a cataleptic 
presentation0(25) Descriptively, of course, all animals perceive0 Indeed, . 
aisthesis and home are the faculties which characterize animals in contrast to 
plants and lower entities. To the non-sage, then, nothing is fully perceptible, 
just as nothing is oikeion— in the ideal sense. So, Plutarch is hinting, the 
aisthesis which is the foundation of oikeiosis is impossible and Chrysippus 
again contradicts himself0
Plutarch1s narrow polemic builds on the assumption that oikeiosis is a 
perception and grasp of the oikeion. This assumption is approximately correct 
(for properly aisthesis is a necessary condition of oikeiosis, not identical to 
it) and is confirmed by Porphyry (of all people) in his De Abstinentia 
(3.19 = SVF lol97): kai gar oikeioseos pases kai allotrioseos arche to
aisthanesthai0 As Kerferd says (op0 cit. p0. 186), "the process of oikeiosis 
is a process of self-recognition". All oikeiosis is a process of recognition 
of naturally established affinities. The affinities could not be meaningful for 
the agent unless they were perceived, brought into the cognitive world of that 
agento Mere existence of a natural affinity is powerless to create that rela­
tionship of self to self (or self to other— see below) known as oikeiosis.
Why would anyone want to deny this? Antiochus’ account of an animal’s early 
development provides a clue0 Their activities are thought of as being quite 
automatic, independent of any response to perception of their environment let 
alone themselves (above on De Finibus 5.24 ff0)o He argues (at 5.41) that 
self-knowledge does not begin at birth. For if it did, an agent "would immediately 
see what we are looking for, the end and limit of our objects of desire, and he 
would be unable to go wrong in any point. But as it is at first our nature is 
hidden in a remarkable fashion and cannot be known; however, as we gradually 
mature, little by little, or rather quite slowly, we get to know ourselves, as 
it were". Antiochus insists that self-love and the corresponding hormai to 
self-preservation precede any meaningful grasp of our own nature and how it 
differs from other animal natures. Then only do we "begin to pursue those things 
which we are born to pursue".
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The movements of the newborn are instinctive and almost plantlike: parvi
primo or tu sic iacent, tamquam omnino sine animo sint (5· 42) ; it is only later 
that they gain strength and·begin to use their souls and senses to deal with the 
external worldo This view of infant psychology is in marked contrast to the 
Stoic, which insists that birth marks a decisive break with the embryonic 
existence. As Hierocles establishes at the beginning of his treatise, at birth 
the previously plantlike foetus suddenly acquires a soul with the characteristic 
powers of horme and aisthesis and immediately exercises them. This sharp transi­
tion bears comparison with the two later crises in life: the
acquisition of reason and the sudden elevation to the status of sage,
if it is ever achievedo Stoic psychology leaned heavily on such sharp develop­
mental ’passages1 and exploited them in ethics. The Academic-Peripatetic psycho­
logy which we see in Antiochus is more realistic and biological, giving what we 
think of as due consideration to gradual and uninterrupted growth and change, an 
imperceptible and continuous unfolding of natural potentials.(26) The Stoics 
overlaid this biological viewpoint with their own and very different emphasis on 
rigidly defined stages of life.
Antiochus’ critique of the role of self-perception raises an objection to 
the Stoic claim that it is the necessary condition for self-love and the resultant 
actions. A man would, it is claimed, have to have a clear grasp of his ultimate 
nature from the moment of birth. To a degree this is unfair. The Stoics did 
not mean to thrust infallible knowledge of human nature onto babes in arms, but 
only a form of perception which is plausibly rudimentary. The serious objection, 
though, is that a neonatal perception of one’s nature is not possible, since that 
nature is still incohate at best. And this kind of objection was taken seriously 
by Stoics, for it would seem that Seneca’s sources for Letter 121 (Archedemus 
and Posidonius) clarified the orthodox theory of oikeiosis accordingly (121014ff)0 
At birth the animal is aware of and loves his current constitution. As this con­
stitution evolves and changes so does the awareness of it0 At each stage of 
development only the existing nature of the animal is known and lovedo Man does 
not perceive and strive to preserve his rational nature until he in fact becomes 
rational (at age 7 or 14).
I doubt that this is a substantial change to the Chrysippean theory. It 
is more like a clarification designed to get around this Academic criticism, 
which may in fact not have been original with Antiochus. There is an interesting 
consequence of the Stoic theory as thus clarifiedo Since the óikeiosis to self 
and the impulse to self-preservation follow upon a perception of self, and this 
follows upon the evolution of one’s nature as one matures, the drive to self- 
preservation is not also a drive to personal development as it is in Antiochus’ 
and Alexander’s verions; it is not a voluntary drive to proceed to the next state 
of life, to actualize the potential of one’s species, only to perfect the state 
one is in'o In this connection it is worth noting that NicholasWhite(27) has 
recently stressed that Antiochus’ theory puts far more emphasis on ’self-realization’ 
than the Stoics dido There are aspects of White’s discussion of the Stoic theory 
with which I cannot agree,/ but to this extent his study fits in with the different 
ways in which the two schools look at the relation between perception and oikeiosis.
This argument also points to a rather different conception of self in 
Antiochus’ work. The self he is concerned with is the fully mature state of 
the animal, and this is a bipartite entity: body and soul considered as distinct
entities. Of these the developed rational soul is by far the more important and 
is, indeed, the dominant element. It is love for this fully developed compound
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nature which draws human beings on and grounds their characteristic behaviour·
Thus even when discussing children Antiochus makes use of their innate love for 
knowledge and virtue— characteristics of reason— (De Finibus 5042-43, 48, 61)„ 
Hierocles and other Stoics(28) do not argue in this way for the simple reason 
that it would contradict their own theories: children do not have reason; self-
love is directed to oneself as one is; the self is an intimate blend of body and 
soul, not a compound of two distinct entities.
Is there another psychological basis for the Academic-Stoic debate on 
self-perception? For the Stoics, the oikeiosis is a set of dispositions to act 
in certain self-preservatory ways· But, as the synopsis of Chrysippus1 theory 
at D.L. 7,85 and many other Stoic sources make clear, action is always preceded 
and caused by a horme, which itself is always a response to a perceptual 
stimulus (aisthesis or phantasia)·(29) In the context of the Stoic psychology 
of action, no action could be performed without the stimulus of a prior perception 
In contrast to the Antiochean model of infant psychology,(30) the Stoic theory 
employed a strict stimulus-response modelo Action never just happens, it never 
flows from within the animal all on its own as a result of unprompted instinct. 
Perceptual stimulation is always necessary0 There are, of course, instinctual 
predispositions to respond to stimuli in set ways, but no instinctive drives 
(like the Platonic eros) which emerge on their own steam, as it were.
There may be more to the disagreement over the role of self-perception. 
Another general difference between Stoicism and Platonism may be relevant here0 
Antiochus1 main criticism of Stoic ethics in De Finibus 4 and 5 depends on his 
version of a body-soul dualismo Although soul is material for this Stoically . 
inclined Academic, it is still viewed as one of the two distinct component 
parts of the human being. The goal of life will only be achieved when both parts 
are functioning properly. The Stoic view of man.is, as we have seen, more unified 
The constitutio or sustasis¿which is equivalent to the animal itself as the ob­
ject of self-love, is defined by the Stoics as a relation of soul to bodyc The 
self, as one of Hierocles1 arguments (3056-4.53) for self-perception makes clear, 
is a physical unity. It is the excellent condition of this compound entity, the 
soul-in-relation-to-body, which constitutes the goal of lifeG This highly 
unified organism, the soul-body compound mixed in a krasis dif holou, is aware 
of itself as a whole if it is aware of anything. For the soul, if it exists at 
all, is by definition capable of perceiving. But the more dualistic model of 
soul which Antiochus held as a Platonist makes self-perception (as opposed to 
perception of one’s own body) more problematic and not the sort of state which 
follows automatically from the essential characteristics of soul and body. Self­
perception— or self-knowledge, I should say, since Antiochus prefers more intellec 
tual language on this point— is a complex and sophisticated task. It is cer­
tainly not one which could be performed from the very moment of birth, even 
before external objects could be perceived.
I suggest, then, that anyone with an inclination to psycho-physical dualism 
will naturally tend to resist the Stoic notion of primitive self-perception«
The Stoics, whose materialism is a powerful extension of Aristotlefs unified and 
hylomorphic view of soul and body, just as naturally embraced self-perception.
The Academic disapproval of the Stoic theory, then, is rooted at least partially 
* in fundamental disagreement over the body-soul relationship and, in a correspond­
ing disagreement about the nature of the self.
Another of the contrasts between Antiochus and the Stoics has a similar
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significance. As was noted above, for Antiochus nature seemed to operate on 
newborn animals without their awareness or conscious collaboration. Nature and 
man are quite distinct. Man begins later on to reflect on naturefs activity, 
discovering after the fact what his nature is. For the Stoics, nature operates 
through the animalfs psychological faculties at each stage0 It is the awareness 
of its own self which leads the way in each animalfs pursuit of its natural 
behaviour patterns. Thus in D.L0 7085 the teleological efforts of nature are 
carried out through naturefs endowment of animals with certain dispositions.
Nature does not do things for animals; she gives them the dispositions which 
enable them to do things for themselves. The preference for regarding nature as 
immanent in the members of each species, rather than as some outside power, is 
also part of the Stoafs genuinely Aristotelian heritage.
But let us return to Hierocles for more specifics. Why self-perception?
This, after all, is Hierocles’ main point0 The actions of all animals are funda­
mentally self-preservatory. It does little good to perceive the external world 
if you cannot distinguish the beneficial from the harmful. All of the goal- 
directed actions of the animal depend on having some notion of the self which is 
to be preservedo At the heart of the Stoic position is the sensible realization 
that all purposive action is relational, based on a view however incohate of 
the agent’s relation to the world.(31) In his preface to the edition of Hierocles, 
von Arnim complains that Hierocles’ examples of animal response to external 
threats are beside the point, which is to establish self-perception as a fact 
(pp. xxi-xxii). But this is a misguided criticism. A baby chick’s automatic 
flight from a hawk or a cat shows not just that it perceives the hawk or cat, 
but that it also perceives something about itself (cf. Seneca Letter 121019-21), 
as does its failure to flee those animals which are not natural predators. The 
behaviour can only be explained if the chick perceives its own nature as well as 
that of the predator.
Again we can see that a general philosophical principle underlies the school 
polemico The insistence on self-perception as the necessary conditon of goal- 
directed behaviour reflects an advance on earlier theories of action (Aristotle’s 
and Epicurus’, for example)0 It is in fact a better explanation of goal-directed 
behaviour. If Academic critics were reluctant to accept this point, then perhaps 
Hierocles1 contempt for them is not so difficult to understand0
To summarize0 We may make one or two general remarks about Hierocles’ 
philosophical stature based on this debate0 His acuity is shown not in his new 
doctrine but in his perception of where the crux of the debate lay and in his 
elaboration of new arguments from older material0 He saw, correctly, that the 
battle over oikeiosis was to be fought on the grounds of the detailed theory 
which could be offered.about the psychology of self-perception. Unlike some 
other later Stoics, he knew what was central, where the principal issues lay, and 
he went at these points clearly, directly and thoroughly. He set up a challenge 
to the braduteroi, those Academics who, perhaps, had attacked the conclusions 
drawn from the Stoic theory without properly refuting the premisses0 It is the 
mark of a keen philosophical mind to see the issue, to focus on the strong points 
in one’s own position and to force one’s opponents to debate on your ground not 
theirso Whether any contemporary Academic was up to this challenge we shall pro- * 
bably never know.
When we turn to the second problem which I mentioned at the outset, Hierocles 
and his Stoic predecessors come off less well. For there is a problem in the 
Stoic use of oikeiosis as a foundational principle of ethics which, I would argue,
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goes back to Chrysippus himself and is never properly resolved, even in Hierocles’ 
day. Academics seem to have zeroed in on this point too, and there is no sign that 
he or his predecessors ever fully appreciated the force of their attack or de­
veloped a response that would be defensible in debate. I refer to the problem of 
the relationship between the two forms of oikeiosis and the resulting tension be­
tween the themes of egoism and altruism in Stoic ethics.(32)
In Stoic theory, oikeiosis served two distinct purposes. The primal com­
mitment to self-preservation formed the basis of the theory of the telos, 
since the commitment of the adult to living the life of reason was supposed to be 
derived by a process of natural (though not inevitable) moral evolution from the 
self-preservatory urges of the new-born animal. The commitment to the self re­
mained constant, but as the self changed the focus of that commitment shifted 
from the preservation of mere animal existence to the maintenance of the characteris­
tically human nature, reason0 But as our sources also tell us, a form of oikeiosis 
was also used to ground our commitment to others, as a foundation for justice and 
the other-regarding virtues generally. The best evidence we have (and it does 
leave something to be desired) suggests that this form of oikeiosis was rooted 
in our instinctive love for our own off-spring, which is then generalized to 
all fellow creatures (see StQ Rep. 12 for instance). But in fact it is open to 
question whether the Stoics ever found a satisfactory way of accounting for the 
relationship between these two potentially conflicting orientations of human 
nature.(33) Epictetus is typical on this point; he asserts flatly (Diss0 1.19.13) 
that the nature of a rational animal has been set up in such a way as to ensure that 
this altruistic orientation is a component part of our essentially egoistic approach 
to ethics. But it is far from clear whether this optimistic assertion about human 
rationality can be sustained either in argument or in the face of practical 
decisions in real life. Seneca, who clearly formulates the egoistic approach to 
ethics of the Stoa (Letter 121.17: si omnia propter curam me! fació, ante
omnia est mei cura), elsewhere emphasizes our basic commitment to others. No doubt 
he believed that egoism properly interpreted and altruism were compatible— but 
how? When a situation comes up where these two principles appear to conflict, 
how is one to adjudicate the competing claims on human nature, if both forms of 
oikeiosis are held to be fundamental?
The general problem, of course, was hardly new in Greek thought. Plato’s 
Republic attempted to resolve it by arguing that other-regarding actions ’pay 
off’ for the agent because they flow from and reinforce the optimal state of 
the agent’s soul.(34) But we lack a comparable Stoic account, where the need of it 
is more acute since they quite deliberately derived the goal of life, i.e. virtuous 
action, including social virtues, from a natural drive to self-preservation.
In both of his works Hierocles touches on the issue at hand and so he 
raises the expectation that a resolution be given. In the Stoicheiosis (col. 9) 
he lists three kinds of oikeiosis: the egoistic eunoetike (which is pros heauto),
the social sterktike based on family affection (sungenike) and a third hairetike, 
directed at ta ektos chremata. His discussion of these is lost, and with it we 
have lost whatever attempt he made to reconcile the former two. By column 11 
he is firmly in the midst of an account of social oikeiosis alone. Was there 
room in columns 9 and 10 to solve the problem? Doubts we may have on this point 
are hardly allayed by the other relevant text, this one from a long passage on 
oikeiosis preserved by Stobaeus (Flor. 84.23-). This is the famous ’concentric 
circle’ passage, of which the following is the key portion (p0 61.10-26, 62.4-7 
in von Arnim’s edition of Hierocles):
- 18-
In general each of us is, as it were, circumscribed by many circles, 
some smaller, some bigger and some enclosing and other enclosed 
according to the different and unequal relationships towards one 
another. The first and most intimate circle is that which someone 
has himself drawn as though around a centre point, his own mind.
In this circle are enclosed both the body and those things adopted 
for the sake of the bodyQ For this circle is, more or less, the smallest 
and practically in contact with the centre. Second after this and more 
removed from the centre and enclosing the first is that in which parents, 
siblings, wife and children are placed. The third is that in which 
are placed uncles and aunts, both grandfathers and grandmothers, the 
children of one’s siblings and cousins too. Next is the circle which 
contains the rest of oneTs relations0 Next to this is the circle of 
onefs demesmen, and next the circle of one’s, tribesmen, then that of 
one’s fellow citizens and moreover in the same way that of one’s fellow 
townsmen and those of the same race. The outermost and greatest 
circle, which encloses all the circles is that of the entire human 
race. These things being established, it is the duty of a serious man 
concerning the proper treatment of each of these groups to draw to­
gether somehow the circles towards the centre and to be serious about 
constantly moving those from the enclosing circles towards the enclosed 
ones.ooFor the remoteness of blood relationship, being quite large, 
will detract somewhat from one’s good will. But still we must be 
serious about the task of equating them. For it would be a reasonable 
accomplishment if through our treatment of them we reduced the distance 
of our relationship to each category of relationship.
Our various relationships to self and others are seen as a set of concentric 
circles, with our own intelligence egocentrically at the middle0 The problem of 
how the self is to be related to others is dealt with by prescribing an attempt 
to draw the outer circles, representing others, in towards the middle, repre­
senting oneself and one’s own self-interest. If complete success were ever to 
be achieved, one’s feeling of concern and love for all mankind would be rendered 
equal in intensity with one’s concern and love for one’s own self. (Although 
not with one’s attachment to one’s own reason0 Hierocles says nothing about 
making any of the circles touch the centre, one’s dianoia, only the innermost 
of the circles which is the body and associated material advantages. At 
De Finibus 3.70 the problem is posed in these terms.) But while this sheds 
light On the factual situation of man— our self-love is more powerful than our love 
for others— it does nothing to resolve the question at hand. In the ideal case 
of the successful moral practitioner, the sage, how are we to deal with a situa­
tion of conflict between self-interest and regard for others? Ideally both 
should be equal0
There are three problems0 First, is this ideal state possible? Second, 
how is it grounded in human nature? And third, if it is achieved, how could 
conflicts be resolved? Sadly, Hierocles answers none of these, though (at 
least) he avoids simple-minded optimism about the answer to the first question.
Should we expect Hierocles to have addressed these problems, even solved 
them? Undoubtably yes. The conflict of self-interest and altruism is obvious 
enough and was dealt with at length by Hecaton (De Qfficiis 3.89) and many 
others, notably Antipater and Diogenes (De Qfficiis 3049 ff). Moreover, the 
anonymous commentator on the Theaetetus. who may have been roughly contemporary 
with Hierocles,(35) raised the issue explicitly in the context of oikeiosis.
Among his criticisms is an ideal test case which goes back at least to 
Hecaton: two men, presumably sages, are left after a shipwreck, clinging to a
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scrap of wood which will support only one. Is it possible to love your neigh­
bour as yourself now? If so, how should you act?(36) Hecatonfs answers (in 
his version it is stated explicitly that the two survivors are sages) are 
facile,(37) and the later text suggests that the debate went on into Hierocles1 
own day. Without a solution, how could a Stoic blithely assume the compatibi­
lity of personal and social oikeiosis?
The commentator clearly thinks that the equipollence of the two oikeioseis 
is impossible and so he finds the Stoic attempt to ground justice in the social 
version untenable. Plato did better in his decision to base justice on homoiotes 
pros ton theon (7.14-20). The debate was clearly a pointed one: the commentator
cleverly argues (6.29 ff) that the Stoic theory of justice is no better than 
the reductionist and utilitarian Epicurean theoryI Touche!
On the question of possibility the commentator hits home. He argues on a 
variety of grounds (5.24-6.20) that the selfish drive of personal oikeiosis 
does and must override a concern for others. In this attack he exploits the 
Stoics against themselves, in the best Carneadean tradition.
That the Stoics did not have answers for these problems seems very likely.
That Hierocles ignored this persistent challenge is probable, though not prov­
able. We have seen him take up one contemporary criticism and solidly turn it 
back on the critic. Now he dodges another0 What are we to say of his dialecti­
cal skills and philosophical merits?
I suspect that Hierocles is about average in philosophical acumen among 
Stoics of the first two generations after Chrysippus. No later Stoic could approach 
the subtlety and power of the second founder. But neither is Hierocles a mere 
Musonius or a simple popularizer of the inherited theories* If we seek a com- j.
parison, we might look to the scholars of the second century B*C., Diogenes 
and Antipater :(38) serious, capable, debaters; strong in defending the 
schoolls strengths, weak in defending its weaknesses; eager for debate, but 
reluctant to abandon the doctrines of Chrysippus even if unable to rebut the 
critics adequately.
The Stoicism of the second century A.D. was not at its acme, but neither 
was it philosophically negligible. Between the moralists of the fringe, whose 
works are well preserved, and the dialectical giants of the good old days, now 
all but lost, there was a wide range of, philosophical activity* Hierocles gives 
us a glimpse of the middle ground during this period* We might properly feel 
as much regret for the loss of his and other works of his day as we do for the 
loss of so much else of Hellenistic debate.
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NOTES
1 The text of the papyrus (and the Stobaeus fragments) was published in Berliner
Klassikertexte, Heft 4 (Berlin 1906) by Ho von Arnim and W. Schubart under the 
title Hierokles: Ethische Elementarlehre/ Other important works: Karl Praechter,
Hierokles der Stoiker (Leipzig 1901); Robert Philippson, fHierokles der Stoiker1 
Rheinisches Museum 82 (1933) 97-114; S0 Pembroke, 'Oikeiosis*cho 6 of Problems in 
Stoicism edo A.A. Long (London 1971); G.B. Kerferd, 'The Search for Personal 
Identity in Stoic Thought1 Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library 55 (1972) 
177-196.
2 P. 118.
3^  Praechter p0 107
4 Or possibly only one: the question whether the Stobaeus extracts are from the
same work as the Stoicheiosis was debated by von Arnim, Praechter (in Hermes 51 
1916 p0 519) and Philippson.
5 The addition of a third form of oikeiosis may well be a late development0. Re­
ference to the oikeiosis towards external objects is also found in the anonymous 
commentary on Plato1s Theaetetus. Compare Posidonius1 more radical change to the 
traditional doctrine: he posited a distinct oikeiosis in each of the.three parts of
a Platonically divided soul (frr. 160, 169 E-K)0
6 NB appetitus = horme at De Officiis 1.11, representing Panaetius’ adaptation 
of the theory.
7 Compare also Tertullian’s remarks, probably of Stoic inspiration, at SVF 2.845o
8 His references to other discussions of the theme are, perhaps, part of an 
epistolary fiction. No trace of such discussions has come down to us0
9 Or perhaps ’Outlines of Ethics’ü The only other work of this title I know of is by 
Eudromus (DoLo 7039)o The Interpretation of stoicheiosis affects the question whether 
the Stobaeus fragments are from the same work0 They might belong to an ’Outlines’,
but would be less appropriate in a 'Foundations’. My own preference for ’Founda­
tions' is based on the content of what survives of the papyrus0
10 At 1.37-40 they are called 'rather slow-witted’; at 1.42-44 it is 'slow-witted 
and bereft of sense’; in 4.22-24 arid 6.43 ff. he says that no one, not even 
Margites (a proverbially stupid man), would take the position his opponents want
to takeo In column 5 (45-47, 52-53) Hierocles rudely challenges his opponents to 
disagree with him. The overall effect is to suggest that he feels considerable 
contempt for these misguided critics.
11 At 4.54-56 he says that it is reasonable that self-perception occur especially 
in sleep if it is a general .and constant feature of animal life.
12 This is a traditional point; cf. Antiochus on Philoctetes at De Finibus 5.32.
13 See Pembroke p0 118 and n0 20o This is also a point which follows from the 
Stoic theory itself (see SVF 2o63).
14 Hierocles here places aisthesis alone as a 'dominant power’ where we might 
expect him to refer to the set of all characteristic powers of the soul (see
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von Arnim pp. xxix-xxx)0 But throughout Hierocles has simplified his account by con­
centrating on perception alone as the power of the soul which is most important 
for his argumento This seems to be deliberate and I doubt that it seriously affects 
the value of his argumento
15 Preserved in Stobaeus Eclogae 2*47« H. Tarrant has recently suggested that 
the material on oikeiosis in the Anonymous Commentary on the Theaetetus is also by 
Eudorùs (fThe Date of the Anon0 In Theaetetumy Classical Quarterly 33 (1983)
p. 186). While most of his argument is based on other points of doctrine, which I 
am not competent to evaluate, Tarrant does seem to exaggerate the similarity of 
Eudorus1 account of oikeiosis in Eel· 2047-8 to the material in the commentary.
The commentary is concerned primarily with social oikeiosis T Eudorus with personal 
oikeiosis and self-perception0 In fact Eudorusf greater sympathy for the Stoic 
theory is hard to reconcile with the attitude of the commentator and this may 
weaken the suggestion that Eudorus is the same man. Moreover, the elaboration of 
three kinds of oikeioseis instead of two, which the commentator is aware of, is 
unknown in the Stoa before Hierocles0
16 For a recent discussion see H0 Görgemanns yOikeiosis in Arius Didymusf pp. 165-
189 in On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus, ed. W.W. Fortenbaugh
(New Brunswick N0J0 and London, 1983)0
17 De Anima Mantissa pp. 150-153. All portions of the Mantissa may not be by 
Alexander himself, but questions of authenticity are not relevant here.
18 5.24 ff.; 5.41 ffe; 2033; 4016 ff0
19 Seneca, unlike other Stoics, uses similar intellectual language (Letter 
121.10-13) in addition to the perceptual languageo This is no doubt due to the 
influence of the opponents in the debate and their language. Hierocles and Cicero 
are more scrupulouso The occurence of suneidesis in D.L0 7.85 (which is often and 
correctly^ in my view>emended to sunáisthesis) may be a result of a Platonizing 
influencée
20 See esp0 Letter 121 of Seneca0 Antiochus speaks of awareness or knowledge (which 
progresses with age) of mature human natureo This should be contrasted with the 
Stoic point that the perception an animal has of its constitution at each stage
can be of greater or lesser clarity0 This is Hierocles1 subject at 7.50 ff. and 
Senecafs at 121o10-13o Antiochus is concerned with how well one knows the completed 
and perfected nature of one's species at various stages of life; self-perception 
of this order is impossible for a new-born infant (see De Finibus 5041 ff0). The 
Stoics postulate a perception (which may be more or less clear) of the current 
constitution at èvery stage of life0
21 5.33, apparently followed only by Philo Judaeus De Animalibus 94-50
22 It is likely that Seneca's letter on self-perception reflects a response to 
much earlier critics (late second century and early first century B.C.), since he 
mentions Archedemus and Posidonius as sources. The criticism of Academics like 
Carneades inevitably comes to mindo
23 The Middle Platonists (London 1977) pp0 240-1. Taurus presents his account 
as a version of what a Stoic would say, but the omission of self-perception sug­
gests that he is adapting it in an Academic direction.
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24 1 Grasp1 represents the Greek antilepsis: cf. Hierocles 1.45-6, 5.47 for 
the term.
25 D.Lo 7o52: he di1 auton (i0e. the senses) katalepsis. This ideal or
normative use of aisthesis would make it the equivalent of episteme. My only 
support for this speculative suggestion is the claim at SVF 2.78 that aistheseis 
are all true (in contrast to phantasiai which may be true or false).
26 This is also suggested in the Peripatetic discussion, Mantissa pp. 150-153o
27 ’The Basis of Stoic Ethics1 Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 83 (1979)
pp. 143-178. · ..~~~..
28 Cicero does at De Finibus 3.17-18& But this is unique in a Stoic account 
and is one more reason to challenge the appropriateness of that otherwise puzzling 
section. It is probably Cicero1 s own ill-considered interpolation into his 
source materiale The reference to children *s pleasure in learning contradicts 
the anti-hedonistic tendency of what precedes. The attribution of reason to 
children contradicts Stoic doctrine. Note also that the rest of section 18 fits 
badly into its context.
29 I have discussed this at length in Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoi­
cism forthcoming from OUP.
30 In the Académica Antiochus stays closer to the Stoic theory; he is there 
concerned with episteniology rather than ethics.
31 Note that the same word, antilepsis, is used by Hierocles of self-perception 
(n. 24) and of perception of others relative to oneself (3.21).
32 See my discussion ’The Two Forms of Oikeiosis in Arius and the Stoaf,
pp. 190-201 in On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics (n. 16 above). The disagreement 
among Stoics over the relative value of one’s own reason and that of a friend 
(De Finibus 3.70) brings this tension into the open.
33 Kerferd (above n. 1, pp0 195-6) supplements this with the suggestion that 
our commitment to our rational nature is generalized to a commitment to all 
reason and so to all other men as rational creatureso But there is no direct 
evidence for this.
34 Just actions are a result of justice in the soul: 442d4-443b6; just actions
reinforce justice in the soul: 444c5-e6.
35 Dillon op. cit. pp0 270-271 suggested that he was Albinus or a close asso­
ciate. If Tarrant opG cit. is right in his redating of the commentary to the 
Augustan period, some of the immediacy of the challenge to Hierocles may be lost, 
but none of its importance0
36 Theaetetus commentary 6.20 ff.; De Officiis 3.90.
37 The sage who is of less use to himself or the state will yield the life- 
preserving plank to the other; if they are equal on these counts, as one would 
expect, they will decide by lot. Note the evasion of the issue: cuius magis intersit 
vel sua vel rei publicae causae vivere.
Discussions of kathekonta similar to Hierocles’ are preserved for Antipater too.38
